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Every quarter the Henley Centre for Forecasting publishes 
its survey of leisure in the United Kingdom. A prestige 
marketing organization, specializing in long-term planning 
for the consumer industries, Henley has developed a strong - 
track-record for in-depth social research. One of its 
survey findings makes particularly depressing, if 
familiar, reading. Throughout 1986 a sample profile was 
monitored for their main leisure patterns. What came out 
top were a list of late twentieth century pleasures which 
are principally made- available through market based 
structures: personal shopping, eating take-away meals, 
DIY, video watching. Right at the bottom of the list came 
politics. Going to a political meeting ranked on a par 
with a visit to the circus as one of our last likely 
things to do! Politics as something pleasurable, as 
something to do with one's disposable leisure time, it 
seems, is a decided non-starter. 1 
This paper is focused via two inter-related themes touched 
on by the Henley Centre's survey: the articulation between 
a series of post-war political discourses and the leisure 
cultures of contemporary consumer capitalism. The 
arguments centre primarily on British politics and 
culture, though many of the debates reviewed present their 
analysis more globally, speaking of general 
characteristics of the 'advancedt industrial economies, 
the 'mature' democracies, and so on. The arguments 
advanced about changes in the relation between forms of 
political and.cultura1 power are deliberately grounded' in 
fairly precise historical and social contexts, rather than 
through models pitched at high levels of abstraction. 
Specifically, it is argued that the weakening of post-war 
discourses of formal representative democracy charted 
within liberal political theory and shifts in the sphere 
of leisure and private sector consumption are not discrete 
developments, but dynamically inter-related features of 
British society since the 1960's. The research is 
therefore concerned to bring into an analytical relation 
two sets of debates which are usually kept strictly 
separated by the boundaries of political science on the 
one hand and various traditions of cultural analysis on 
the other. The implications for the concerns of the Power 
Conference are twofold. First to contribute to a more 
dispersed conception of power which includes the spheres 
of leisure, consumption and personal life, but also to 
table an agenda for examining the articulation between 
different permutations of power. The arguments centre 
both on some of the micro-structures of power in the 
Foucauldian sense - specific domains and technologies, 
modes of address, formations of pleasure and subjectivity, 
possibilities of resistance - and with the inter- 
dependence of different regimes of power. 
In the closing section of the paper it is pointed out that 
this latter issue of the inter-relation between domains - 
here specifically between the processes of formal 
democracy and culture - has emerged as a feature of 
contemporary British politics. One response to the 
perceived decline of 'formal representative democracy has 
been to elaborate a notion of 'cultural politics', which 
carries with it a particular reading of commercially- 
based, popular culture. The paper examines those 
conceptions of 'the popular' and cultural politics in some 
detail, concluding that while they have made significant 
contributions to theorising the deployment of cultural 
power and its resistance a number of difficulties remain. 
A latent instrumentalism - with its historical legacy in 
much earlier ideas of cultural transmission - and a 
confusion over the specific dynamics of cultural, as 
opposed to political transformation (with a consequent 
tover-politicization' of'culture) are the two issues which 
are highlighted.' In conclusion it is argued that a 
'politicst of culture needs to develop a greater clarity 
over the processes and the ends of cultural 
transformation. 
The Decline of Civic Culture 
We begin though with an earlier debate which brings 
political and cultural life into alignment. Mapping the 
rise in feelings of political apathy or distrust involves 
dusting down a research tradition which was once pre- 
eminent in Britain and the USA. This is the work of 
liberal democratic theorists of the 1950's and '60's who 
- were. concerned to explain, not political disaffection, but 
the conditions of stable, participatory democracy and 
'mature' political development. Texts like Almond and 
Verbals The Civic Culture, 1963, or Lipset's Political 
Man, 1960, celebrate the democratic structures of Britain 
and the USA (as opposed to what are defined as the more 
precarious political cultures of Germany or Italy), 
concluding that democratic stability rests not simply on 
the maturity of elites or parties, but on an active and 
responsible civic culture which guarantees ordinary 
citizens participation in the political process. It has 
by now become almost de riaueur for writers on democratic 
theory to open with an exposure of the limitations of this 
model. The historically and culturally specific notions 
of stability embedded in the research, the failure to 
probe behind the class and gender barriers to becoming an 
'active citizen', resulting in an exclusive definition of 
the citizen as middle-class and male - these are 
characteristic critiques which are marshalled. yet 
despite these inadequacies, what was noteworthy about the 
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research in texts like The Civic Culture was precisely the 
questions asked about the relation between political 
participation and cultural life; or what Almond and Verba 
termed political culture and civic culture. Noting that 
the day-to-day reality of the ordinary British or American 
citizen was rarely the idealized political culture of 
civics textbooks (where the citizen is forever rational, 
reasonable and well-informed) , Almond and Verba began to 
interrogate the cultural determinants which equipped the 
'ordinary man1 [sic] to develop a high level of civic 
~ompetence.~ Previous studies of the impact of culture on 
politics had dealt in impressionistic evidence such as 
notions of national character, but here we began to see 
the ways in which family networks, community 
organizations, education and leisure either stimulated or 
discouraged active political participation. And if the 
conclusions only vindicated the wisdom and maturity of 
British and American professional men, these studies did 
at least begin to raise the issue of how political culture 
is perceived and participated in - not in the sphere of 
the prominent actors, but at the level of the ordinary and 
the everyday and through the filters of commonsense. 
Most commentators working within this tradition insist 
that there has been a steady decline in the forms of 
active democratic participation since their celebrated 
4 highwatermark in the early 1960's. While explanations for 
this decline vary, concern over political distrust or 
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alienation is recurrent in recent debates over the future 
of western democratic systems. To canvass some of the 
data on the United Kingdom alone. Voting turnout at 
general elections has been falling consistently since the 
1950gs, but it was in the ' 7 0 ' s  that a series of political 
surveys profiled the problem. A 1972 cross-section of the 
adolescent population of London, when questioned about 
their political values, projected a very different persona 
from that of the active citizen. What was manifest was a 
high degree of cynicism about the quality of national 
government. Sixty three per cent of the sample felt that 
'MP1s don't know what they're doing', sixty one per cent 
felt that 'people like themselvesv had no say in what the 
government did.' A year later an Attitudes to MP's Opinion 
Research Survey reinforced these findings among the adult 
population, when fifty eight per cent of the sample agreed 
with the view that 'people become MP's for their own gain 
and to further their own ambitions' . 6  Four years earlier 
the Royal Commission on the Constitution (established 
primarily in response to demands from Scotland and Wales 
for devolution or independence) had sounded similar 
warning noises about growing political distrust. 
Reluctantly the Commission admitted to a 'general feeling 
of dissatisfaction with the system of running Britaini. 7 
The Commissionls Minority Report went much further. It 
argued that there was in Britain 'a widespread and grave 
disquiet about our system of government', founded on a 
'justifiable belief that the country is becoming less 
democratic' and that 'the people have not enough say in, 
and influence on government . The Kilbrandon Commission ' s 
majority statement ignored these warnings, merely re- 
asserting its faith in representative democracy. 
Nonetheless, the same sort of findings surfaced in opinion 
polls and attitude research surveys throughout the 1970's 
and '80's. A large majority in a British Social Attitudes 
survey of 1987 felt that: 'Generally . . . those we elect. as 
MP's quickly lose touch with their constituents1, while 
sixty six per cent believed that 'political parties were 
only interested in people's votes, not in their opinions'. 9 
I have focused in some detail on this discourse of 
political research because it is significant in organising 
and projecting ,a public debate about national political 
institutions and their leaders, rather than because it is 
an accurate commentary on them. In fact, taken, together 
these findings raise as many questions about the perceived, 
loss of confidence in Britain's civic culture as they 
answer. We should note at once that distrust is, 
predictably, not uniform across all social groups but is 
consistently strongest among the young and among unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers. 10 Confidence in democracy, it 
seems, very much depends on where you are and how you look 
at it. Moreover, the idea of a spiralling decline in 
political authority, with the 1950's implicitly 
constructed as the moment of stable equilibrium, rests on 
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lingering if unspoken assumptions about the immediate 
post-war decades as the high point of democratic 
consensus. Against this coherent image of the '50's the 
political developments and culture of later decades will 
always be judged to be lacking. Such an account of the 
consensus years has been challenged from other sources 
which argue that the 1950's themselves produced strong 
feelings of political disassociation. l1 But what is 
significant about this body of empirical research is less 
the precise conclusions, than the political and cultural 
terrains which are linked together. This returns us to 
the issue posed symbolically by the Henley Centre in their 
leisure survey - the possible lines of interconnection 
between political culture and the leisure cultures of 
civil society. 
Leisure, Consumption and Private Life 
Growing apathy towards democratic institutions has not it 
seems taken place in a vacuum. From this body of 
research, apathy does not simply register a negative 
stance, but a corresponding commitment to quite other 
rituals and forms of association. As early as Almond and 
Verbals study, what was being remarked on was that it was 
'only the rare individualt who 'considered his role as 
citizen more important than his role in immediate 
neighbourhood , family and community . l2 When respondents 
in the survey were asked questions about the issues that 
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worried them or about what they considered to be 
important, they usually mentioned family and job problems 
- 
or personal economic worries, but rarely political 
anxieties. An early. 1970's UK survey into people's 
priorities for assessing their ,quality of life 
interrogated this relation between formal politics and 
personal life further. While the survey's findings 
registered the recurrent low levels of satisfaction with 
politics per se, this seemed to have little bearing on 
perceptions of quality of life. What the respondents 
prioritised were things much closer to home. It was job, 
marriage, family life and leisure, rather than democratic 
public institutions, which in general' shaped images of the 
good society.'* Confidence in political culture might be 
low, but these things generally mattered little in the 
order of priorities most people used for running their 
lives. Glossing this continuing trend in the mid 1980's - 
under the impact of some of the newer. leisure and 
consumer cultures - the Henley Centre advance a grandiose 
interpretation of the changing relation between political 
and leisure cultures. This is announced as nothing short 
of the beginning of a shift of allegiance from one 
structure of authority to another: 
From all the evidence it is possible to derive 
a tentative 'hierarchy of authority1 in the 
broadest sense, to include respect and a source 
of pride. The highest authorities these days 
are those people, institutions and 'intellectual 
capital1 most closely associated with our 
personal welfare and sense of identity . . . . 
Something very important is happening to the 
authority structures of our society. It is our 
view that deference to traditional authorities 
in Britain has now hit an all time low . . . . But 
does this imply the absence of any authorities 
at all? The answer is no. Whilst the authority 
of class, of the production side of life has 
declined, that of the consumption side has risen .... The authority we tend to uyf for this is 
from within rather than external. 
There are some suggestive hints here about a possible 
changing relationship between political and public culture 
on the one hand and the consumer-led and personal on the 
other. But these are points of departure for further 
research, not proven conclusions. Like so many 
, commentators working from within the consumer industries 
in the 1980's Henley overstates its case in the interests 
of making an optimistic claim for leisure and consumption 
as the up-and-coming structures of authority. For if 
survey after survey registers disaffection with the 
structure of formal democracy, there is little evidence to 
suggest that there has been any sustained shift of 
allegiance towards lifestyle or consumer-led value 
systems. The claim is also continually made that this 
type of political haemorrhaging is relatively recent. Yet ' 
arguably liberal democratic systems, since their inception 
in the nineteenth century, have rested squarely on the 
assumption that for the majority of citizens, 
participation in politics would be passive only, with 
their energies and interests channelled - often forcibly 
- into areas of life designated as tnon-political'. As 
- 
Carole Pateman put it in relation to the relative non- 
participation of women in such structures over the last 
seventy years, for the majority of women 'faith' in 
democratic government has always been undercut by a quite 
rational perception that the' political lion skin of 
citizenship had a large mane and belonged to a male lion!16 
A more tentative, if less dramatic, interim conclusion 
would be to argue that despite longer continuities, the 
current crisis in political authority in the UK is 
specific to the post-war settlement and that it may indeed 
be precipitated by the impact of cultural transformations 
as much as by political and economic changes. For 
commentators working within the liberal paradigm, 
weakening of democratic institutions is largely seen as 
the product of political fragmentation since the 19601s, 
which is in turn grounded partly in poor economic 
performance, partly in the overloading of the collectivist 
state and partly in the rise of the new politics and 
social movements with their explicit challenge to concepts 
of liberal democracy.17 Such explanations fail to even ask 
questions about the effects of cultural processes on the 
shifts within political discourse. Not surprisingly we 
need to move outside political sociology for the 
integration of a cultural analysis. For there are those 
who do cite cultural institutions and particularly the 
shifting dynamics of mass consumer culture as crucial to 
any assessment of political disaffection. 
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The sociologist and liberation theorist Andre Gorz sees 
the massive expansion of leisure and consumption within 
'post-industrial' societies as throwing up a challenge not 
so much to liberal democracy, rather to traditional 
socialist politics. For Gorz the de-centring of the 
importance of work in the lives of millions of service 
sector workers is leading to a crisis in the politics of 
production. Gorz reads this as entirely positive, 
breaking the Marxist legacy of 'normalizing, repressive 
conformity associated with the discourse of organized 
labour' and opening up the real struggle for human 
freedom, based on the assertion -of 'tenderness, love, 
creativity, aesthetic pleasure'~.18 All of this is now 
taking place prefiguratively, we are told, through the 
energies and desires people invest not in organized class 
politics but in: 'family life, a home of one's own, a back 
garden, a do-it-yourself workshop, a boat, a country 
cottage, a collection of antiques, music, gastronomy, 
sport, love, etc. 'I9 Gorz, like the Henley Centre, 
overstates his case. But if his generalizations about the 
decline. of one form of political discourse and the rise of 
another remain polemical (and ultimately rest on 
essentialist notions of human nature), then what is again 
significant about the argument is his exploration at the 
instercises of political and cultural systems and the 




consumption generate their own patterns of self-determined 
action. 
A more well-rehearsed use of cultural analysis to explore 
the specific sea-changes taking place with British 
politics since the late 1970's is one which sees a close 
inter-relation between market-based cultures of 
consumption, political disaffection and the successes of 
the political right. For the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman 
'Britain's exit from politics' (apathy, distrust, 
alienation from political institutions) has been fostered 
by successive Conservative governments encouraging the 
electorate to 'buy oneself out of politicsg, to see 
politics as only a nuisance - a barrier to real life which 
lies elsewhere - in the world of personal freedoms, the 
market and so on. 20 Bauman is, like Gorz, probing the 
interface between one form of political discourse and 
patterns of mass taste. Arguments like these were 
discussed across a spectrum of left political culture in 
Britain in the 1980's as part of an attempt to formulate 
responses to the successes of the new right.21 Yet can the 
relation between politics and culture simply be evoked by 
an appeal to the ascendancy of market-based consumption? 
When Bauman and others talk of the effects of the 
iconography of the market in accelerating feelings of 
political alienation, they are employing a familiar 
shorthand to stand in for a more precise cultural 
anthropology of the present. If patterns of mass culture 
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do have effects on forms of political association - as is 
claimed - what precisely are the contemporary forms of 
culture which are most influential? 
Market research over the last decade has been in the 
business of charting patterns of popular taste, not in 
order to gauge their effects on political imagery, but to 
predict future trends for the consumer industries. Here 
are forms of knowledge and professional expertise which 
have expanded rapidly with the growth of the post-war 
consumer industries and forms of mass culture. We are 
dealing with intellectuals, in the broad sense of the 
term, whose occupations, as Pierre Bourdeieu puts it, 
involve some from of symbolic representation in the 
handling of goods and services. 22 But what can the 
prognoses of market research deliver, judged by the 
standards of academic discourse? Isn't marketing a system 
so bound up with enterprise and the firm that its findings 
are always fundamentally flawed? Academic distrust of 
these newer experts may highlight some of its own 
prejudices: a suspicion of market-based cultures or an 
unstated awareness that these 'older' and 'newer' 
professional discourses are in some form of competition 
over the.ir respective regimes of truth - especially in the 
areas of cultural analysis and social science. The point 
here is not to argue for the superiority of marketing over 
forms of academic knowledge, but to insist'that if we are 
concerned to map some of the major trends and indicators 
of commercially driven contemporary culture, then we need 
to engage with the traditions of market research. 
What criteria do market research organisations deal in for 
plotting change in UK consumer and leisure industries? 
One of the most critical factors for consumer markets is 
the dramatically changing population spread. Here a 
substantial drop in the classic teenage market (15-24 age 
range) is offset by a dramatic rise in 25-34 year olds. 
Moreover, what is termed the leading 'empty nestt group 
(couples without dependent children) is set to grow 
strongly; backed by continuing policies of early 
retirement and property inheritance, making them the key 
market- in, many sectors. 23 Among the elderly, the most 
marked change is the predicted rapid rise in the number 
of 'old old' (ie those over 75). Turning to household 
demographies, the marketing predictions are for a 
continuing decline in average household size (reflecting 
a fragmentation of family type and style) and an 
acceleration of the migration from inner city and older 
urban areas to the commuter countryside and to medium- 
sized country towns. 24 
Such findings are familiar from both government statistics 
and commercially commissioned research. But what of 
consumption and current leisure cultures? Here three 
themes come through strongly: the rise of more segmented 
consumer markets, accompanied by proliferating and 
intensified forms of individualism and the consolidation 
of home-centred leisure. Taken together, the marketing 
argument follows a characteristic logic. Economic and 
cultural change is accelerating the break up of those 
traditional mass markets (youth, the working-class, women) 
which were the stable building blocks of post-war 
consumption and replacing them with much more volatile and 
segmented consumer profiles: the working woman, 'grey 
power' or the young elderly, the proliferating images of 
masculinity and so on. Moreover, specific forms of 
individualism projected around personal control, 
individual distinctiveness and particular styles of life, 
rather,than status and social emulation, now lead in many 
market sectors - for food, fashion, holidays, etc. 25 
Finally, a recurrent stress in current market research is 
the consolidation of home-based leisure. Backed by 
seventy per cent UK home-ownership, recent developments in 
electronic leisure technology such as cable and satellite 
TV, video, home computers and by the partial collapse of 
confidence in public leisure venues, improving and 
investing in the home - materially and symbolically - is 
an area in which a wide cross-section of consumers are 
likely to spend a high part of their discretionary income., 
But the move towards home-centred culture is contradictory 
and does not simply work to shore-up familialism. Market 
research now defines the home as a multi-purpose leisure 
site, where its members inter-act as much as consumer 
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individuals around specific products and lifestyles, as 
members of the traditional family unit. 26 
Taken together, these indicators generated by 
professionals within the consumer industries are not 
massively distant from the more academic discussions of 
sociologists and cultural anthropologists about the 
changing structures of 'advancedt industrial societies. 
Shifts in the organisation of consumption and production, 
demographic changes, transformations in the spheres of 
leisure cultures and domestic life are noted by both sets 
of commentators. My point here is less to enter into a 
debate about the precise nature of such developments - 
which remain only suggestive in a paper of this length - 
but to return to the broader arguments about the possible 
relationship between these changes and the sphere of 
formal politics. 
If we can now begin to understand the conception of 
post-war democracy as a specific moment in twentieth 
century political history, we should also observe that as 
a system 'to be believed inp it rested on particular 
assumptions about the organisation of public and private 
life, about cultural norms and values, about the 
presentation of the self, about the gendered dimensions of 
so-called civic life. This infrastructure is no longer as 
secure as it was once perceived to be. Economic, 
demographic and political changes, but also shifts in the 
sphere of commercially organised leisure, have all had 
their effects. In particular, contemporary cultures of 
consumption project images of the good society which sit 
uneasily with the discourse of formal politics. This is 
often an issue of style and presentation, but in a quite 
profound sense. The political language of formal 
democracy is most comfortable with verbal or written 
discourse, working through rational methods of persuasion 
and organised as policies, demands, etc. Its traditional 
methods of mobilising have been via various forms of 
collective action and versions of the massed self: the 
mass party, public meetings, rallies, etc. The growing 
televisualisation of national politics in Britain since 
the 195O8,s has partly shifted these ground rules o-f 
political culture, but not substantially. Current forms 
of leisure and consumption work with a quite different 
agenda which implicitly cuts against these political modes 
of representation. Mobilising what are principally visual 
and aural stimuli, they float images or lifestyles. Their 
appeal is principally through regimes of pleasure and an 
address to much more intimate and multiple senses of the 
self. These features are not in any sense of course new 
(individualism has been a dominant mode of address within 
advertising throughout the post-war period), but current 
forms of consumer culture have marked an intensification 
of the process. 
My general point then, to conclude this part of the 
argument, is that the loss of confidence in the system of 
formal representative democracy charted within political 
science needs to be investigated not simply in relation to 
purely political or economic factors, but against a 
background of cultural transformations. Apathy or 
political cynicism may indeed involve a transference to 
other value systems and centres of interest. Such remarks 
of course are points of departure for further work. For 
example, to what extent this phenomenon is recent, how far 
it pertains to the political experience of specific social 
groups are questions needing further elaboration. 
Mass Culture and Mass Democracy 
This is certainly not the first time that commercial 
- 
leisure has collided with formal politics - transforming 
both areas in the process. Recent historical work has 
shown how the emergence of mass culture and the sea- 
changes in definitions of 'the politicalt in the broad 
period from 1880 to 1920 were not discrete developments, 
but dynamically inter-related. The late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century witnessed large-scale and 
qualitative upheavals in popular cultural forms. New 
industries - the national popular press, commercial music 
hall, spectator sport and later cinema and radio - 
reworked the production and consumption of culture. 
Popular culture, backed by intensive capital investment, 
commercial entrepreneurship and a growing conception of 
national markets, went hand-in-hand with new expectations 
19 
of pleasure, now predominantly set up as entertainment and 
relaxation. These sea-changes had quite profound effects 
on the social experience of subordinate group and classes. 
Gareth Stedman Jones identifies the years 1870-1900 
as a period of 're-making1 of the British working-class, 
quite as crucial as the seminal years 1790-1830. In 
contrast to that earlier moment, the newer forms of 
leisure-consumption are geographically separated out from 
the nodal points of mass trades union activity or the 
politics of the new mass party. 25 But more ' importantly, 
the definitions and expectations surrounding these two 
domains begin to be tightened. Charles Booth in his 
grandiose.survey, Life and Labour of the Peovle of London, 
1887-91, characterizes this shift dramatically as one 
where 'pleasure, amusement, hospitality and sport1 come to 
replace 'trade union, friendly societies and politics 
(including socialism) as the central forces of working 
26 class life'. Booth, of course, rehearses here the early 
form of an argument about the relation between mass 
leisure and politics which has. resonated ever since. For 
here is modern popular culture in its guise as the motor 
of manipulation - neutralizing and pacifying political 
activity. 
Yet if this reading is naive in its model of how 
popular culture works, it is right about one thing. For 
it was during the early years of this century that a new 
bargain was struck between political discourse and 
cultural life. What occurs is not, of course, a decline 
in working-class politics, but a re-definition of the 
boundaries of *politicst and lcultureg, of where one 
stopped and the other began. It is no accident that the 
growth of mass leisure coincided with the moment when the 
discourse of mass democracy was itself being forged and 
implemented. The first decades of the twentieth century 
witness the transformation of this latter area. ,The 
professionalization of electoral politics, the creation of 
the mass party, above all the enshrinement of the doctrine 
of formal political repregentation (institutionalized in 
the Representation of the People Act, 1918) were key 
indicators. But. what is equally significant is the new 
balance that these transformations strike up between 
politics and culture. What was being established here was 
a distinctive field of relations, marking out the 
culturally possible from the politically possible. 
Theories of Popular Culture: Contemporary Cultural 
Politics 
It is the historical inter-relationship between 
political and cultural forces which continues to structure 
forms of contemporary cultural analysis and strategies of 
cultural intervention in a British context. One coherent 
cultural response to the perceived stalemate of formal 
representative democracy outlined earlier has been the 
idea of cultural politics. Influential in left of centre 
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intellectual circles, it involves a re-reading of the 
significance of popular cultural forms and a conception of 
cultural transformation which pushes at the boundaries of 
formal politics. Cultural politics in this guise 
explicitly seeks to address those spheres of everyday life 
which are part of the repertoire mass commercial leisure 
and which have been carefully structured out of the 
language of twentieth century democratic politics. It is 
this conception of the politics of culture and its 
permutations of power which forms the basis for my 
concluding remarks. 
First though we need to situate this particular 
interpretation of culture in its broader political and 
intellectual contexts. In Britain in the 1980's it was 
not left of centre arguments which were initially to the 
fore in identifying the ways in which culture was working 
to transform the political field, but those of the new 
right. Thatcherism not only attempted to shift political 
style and language away from the vocabulary of consensus 
politics, it also annexed a-variety of motifs partly drawn 
from the sphere of contemporary mass culture, working them 
into its own forms of populism.28 The rhetoric of the new 
right for much of the decade (as distinct from many of its 
policies) condensed a series of heroic or romantic 
political images, which while not actually negating the 
language of representative democracy, privileged quite 
other issues. A modernist discourse of transformation, 
the virtues of effective national leadership, a fixed 
epistemology of political and economic truths - these were 
distinctive stylistic features of Thatcherism. Moreover, 
it was the radical right who made the claim that it was 
they who were successfully responding to transformations 
in the cultural and personal orientation of key social 
groups within British society. The language of consumer 
choice, the identification of economic individualism with 
political and cultural freedoms (particularly over the 
freedom to spend money), the glamorisation of the market 
economy - while this type of imagery did not originate 
with the political doyens of the new right, it was run 
together for much of the 1980's into a distinctive 
configuration. Major policy initiatives - such as the 
sale of public sector housing, the consumerisation of 
state services, the privatisation of major public 
utilities via the logic of popular capitalism - underwrote 
the commitment to consumption, choice and cultural as well 
as economic liberty. 
The political and ideological success of the new 
right over the past decade has formed one important 
context in which debates over popular culture and cultural 
politics have been projected. But these have not been 
framed simply as a reaction against consumer capitalism. 
In the words of Stuart Hall, who has played a major role 
in setting the agenda here, studying the popular has 
necessarily involved 'learning from Thatcherism': 
attempting to understand the terms on which the political 
right have drawn on .the language of popular pleasures, 
desires and aspirations, often culling them from the 
sphere o'f poplar culture. 29 
A series of seminal studies have taken as their 
subject matter various strands of cultural activity in 
post-war Britain, broadly associated with specific 
commodities or commercially based forms of production and 
consumption. Many of these have become familiar via 
cultural export as key texts of 'British cultural 
studies'. We might include here accounts of the symbolic 
resistance provided by the 'styles' of post-war British 
youth cultures; the contradictory pleasures and demands 
thrown up for women by the commercially marketed cultures 
of femininity (magazines, popular fiction, etc) or the 
forms of empowerment working-class people have derived 
from the cultures of commodification and consumption. 30 
While there are significant differences of approach, a 
revalorisation of popular cultural forms, with a critical 
distance from earlier paradigms on mass culture, 
constitutes an ongoing emphasis. Significantly, the 
earlier approaches singled out for critical attention-are 
not simply those espoused by cultural conservatives. For 
example, elite models of cultural classification, where 
culture had an exclusive referrent in high-culture (and 
more particularly art-based practices) and was endowed 
with trans-historical notions of value, were equally 
privileged within idealist aesthetics and intellectual 
marxism in the inter-war period. Similarly, concepts of 
tcultural dupingt, with commercial leisure cast as 
stimulating false needs and producing social passivity, 
were arguments advanced by widely differing constituencies 
in the 1950's and 60's in both Britain and the USA - from 
establishment figures like the art historian Kenneth 
Clark, through liberals such as J.K. Galbraith to more 
radical intellectuals like Richard Hoggart -and Betty 
Friedan. 31 
In reassessing popular culture recent authors have 
drawn on various tools of cultural analysis to counter 
those earlier interpretations. Many of these concepts 
have become familiar features -of radical syllabuses and 
reading lists. The impact of semiology and structural 
linguistics has enabled textual readings of cultural 
objects which foreground the active ways in which meanings 
are ascribed to commodities by consumers - meanings which 
at times subvert or disrupt dominant values. While a 
stress on the significant distance between the production 
of cultural forms and their reception foregrounds the 
sense which individuals and social groups themselves 
construct out of popular rituals. Further, there is often 
a distinctive reading of the market contained within such 
forms of analysis, which highlights both the cultural 
dynamics of commodification and the market as the unstable 
point of exchange between producer and consumer - rather 
than as simply either the site of profit maximization on 
the one hand or the sphere of total consumer freedom on 
the other. More often than not the legacy of Gramsci is 
to be felt in this understanding of popular culture - 
especially Gramscils conceptualization as the popular as 
a site of struggle between dominant and subordinate 
groups. 
The intellectuals who have polemicized for this 
approach have not merely sought to transform the cultural 
agenda within higher education institutions, which is 
their base in a formal sense. A working alliance with 
cultural producers and entrepreneurs outside Britain's 
universities and polytechnics - with magazine and 
newspaper journalists, television programmers, arts and 
cultural policy makers, small and medium size service 
sectors businesses - has built up a more expansive 
intellectual milieu with broader notions of cultural 
transformation. 
And if the political rhetoric of the new right has 
given added stimulus to such strategies, the other major 
point of critical dialogue has been the social democratic 
politics which we have charted. Here the engagement has 
been particularly with labourist and Labour Party codes of 
politics. In conjunction with arguments derived from the 
new social movements, cultural politics has formed part of 
the broader challenge to the boundaries of formal 
politics, bringing into visibility concerns which had been 
relegated to the lnon-politicall side of civic culture. 
Consumption, personal identities, pleasure, desire and 
fantasy are recurrent icons in the writing on popular 
culture and frequently their challenge is posed to the 
perceived narrowness of what socialist discourse has 
become' in its politically organized forms. 
Such an overview is to chart what have become a 
familiar series of interventions. But my concluding 
remarks are concerned to probe this lpoliticall strategy 
for culture in light of the historical developments which 
have been mapped. The paper has advanced a series of 
arguments about the historical relationship between the 
domain of formal democratic politics and the sphere of 
popular culture in Britain. Current notions of cultural 
politics theorise that relationship in very specific ways 
and strategically push at the boundaries of the two 
domains - arguing for culture to be acknowledged as a 
valid field for Ipolitical1 intervention. Yet there 
remains a confusion within this paradigm over the precise 
sense in which culture is to be politicized. This is not 
simply a confusion of vocabulary and terminology 
(linguistic confusions rarely are simply that), it signals 
a much more fundamental ambiguity over the status of 
culture as a site of lpolitical' activity and over the 
political strategies for cultural change. Commentators 
working within this approach might respond by insisting 
that such a confusion is productive, for it is precisely 
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what gives cultural studies and cultural politics its 
cutting edge. Nevertheless, I would argue that this lack 
of clarity is ultimately disabling. 
'Evaluating the potential progressiveness of popular 
culture', as John Fiske puts it, has been central to the 
way in which the paradigm has defined its objects of 
study. 32 It is to state an obvious, but one which is of 
significance, that such cultural evaluations are performed 
by highly trained intellectuals with the aid of very 
specific forms of professional competence. To insist on 
this is not to romantically yearn for some more authentic, 
popular reading of cultural forms, but it is to point up 
.an awareness of the professionalisation of this field of 
cultural analysis - a professionalisation which has an 
extensive prior history. For Fiske's characteristic 
demand for the progressive evaluation of popular culture 
carries with it the legacy of much older systems of 
cultural intervention - and notably an inheritance from 
the discourse of social reform. It is this nineteenth 
century tradition of educative expertise initially 
directed as intervention from without into the habits of 
life of recalcitrant social groups, which first isolates 
culture as a site of strategic transformation. The 
production of 'the social1, as Jaques Donzelot terms it, 
as a specific domain which includes culture, but which is 
separate from politics and economics, is a distinctive 
nineteenth century development. 33 The link between the 
early cultural technicians and contemporary cultural 
commentators is not of course in the precise assessment of 
popular culture, but rather .in the type of instrumentalism 
which is integral to both approaches. In the case of the 
nineteenth century expert such an instrumentalism is 
explicit as part of the strategy for reform, while in its 
latter day version it is much more understated. 
Nevertheless, contemporary notions of cultural politics do 
continually interrogate culture from the point of view of 
transformative intervention, which is .termed tpoliticall. 
In what sense it is tpoliticall, whether this is merely a 
. , rhetorical device or something more concrete, remains 
unclear as a result of the continual slippage between the 
ambiguously,specified areas of politics and culture. 
I have focused on these two related problems 
contained within the paradigm of what has been termed 
-- cultural politics - a latent instrumentalism and a 
confused conception of the political - not simply to point 
up theoretical inadequacies, but because such difficulties 
do have implications for interventions in the cultural 
arena. If there is to be intervention in the field of 
commercially based popular culture, we should be clear 
about who is intervening, with what systems of knowledge 
and in order to achieve what strategic aims and goals. 
Loose notions such as the self-empowerment of subordinate 
groups, or ideas of Icultural democracy1 need to be 
rendered much more specific. What also needs clarifying 
are the distinctive modes and strategies of transformation 
appropriate to the cultural domain, rather than merely 
borrowing models from the political arena. Such questions 
can best be pursued in relation to more concrete work on 
particular cultural forms, but the need for this process 
of clarification is long overdue. 
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